
Megaprojects in Canada: Learning from Success

Guy Holburn Ivey Business School, Western University

Professor and Director, Ivey Energy Policy and Management Centre

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Megaprojects have a mixed reputation these days

- ▶ Conventional wisdom is skeptical about megaprojects in general, including in the electricity sector
 - ▶ Media focus on projects with financial and technical difficulties
 - Hydro-electricity projects (e.g. Muskrat Falls)
 - Rail, roads, IT systems, energy
 - ▶ Surveys of megaprojects report large *average* cost over-runs and delays
 - Hydro: +96% average cost over-run, +42% average schedule delay
 - Rail: +41%, +48%
- ▶ Academic research has dug into the causes of problems
 - ▶ Political 'rapture' motivates project approval (Flyvbjerg)
 - ▶ Under-estimation of costs, over-estimation of benefits

The so-called “Iron law of megaprojects”


“Over budget, over time, under benefits,
over and over again”

(Flyvbjerg, 2017)



An alternative perspective: learning from success

- ▶ Conventional focus on megaprojects with poor outcomes ignores the lessons from successful – but less newsworthy – examples
 - ▶ E.g. 23% of hydro projects are completed on or below budget



Source: Flyvbjerg, 2018

Insights from a representative sample of megaprojects

- ▶ Detailed case studies of five electricity megaprojects in Canada with varying performance outcomes


Project	Original Cost	Cost Overrun	Schedule Overrun
Maritime Link, NS (2018)	\$1.7 bn	0%	On time
Darlington Nuclear Refurbishment, ON (2026e)	\$12.8 bn		On time
Western Alberta Transmission Line (2015)	\$1.4 bn	+21%	
Keeyask Generating Station, MB (2022e)	\$6.5 bn	+61% e	+3 yrs
Muskrat Falls, NL (2021e)	\$7.4 bn	+76% e	+3 yrs

Source: Holburn and Fremeth, 2018

- ▶ Regulation and governance are key differentiators of project performance

Best practice regulation of electricity (mega)projects

- ▶ Well designed regulatory institutions and practices can ameliorate inherent informational and incentive challenges in utility investment – including megaprojects




Source: Holburn, 2018

Regulation of Maritime Link versus Muskrat Falls

Maritime Link (+0%)

- UARB conducted hearings to determine whether ML was (i) lowest-cost alternative and (ii) consistent with NS environ. goals.
- UARB approved ML, with expected (P97) cost of \$1.7bn, subject to conditions.
- UARB declined NSPML's 2017 application to recover full costs since ML was not "used and useful". Temporary interim assessment.



Muskrat Falls (+76%)

- Government asked PUB to conduct a restricted review of MF in comparison to one specific alternative.
- PUB could not determine whether it was the least cost option.
- Government sanctioned project, citing support from selected consultant reports.
- PUB prohibited by legislation from reviewing MF costs and prudence of expenditures.
- PUB required by legislation to incorporate all MF costs in electricity rates.

Concluding thoughts

- ▶ Canada has deep expertise with electricity megaprojects, and there are likely to be more development opportunities
- ▶ Successful megaprojects are more frequent than commonly believed
 - ▶ We should pay greater attention to the success stories to learn how to improve future financial and technical performance
- ▶ Regulatory oversight and accountability throughout the project lifecycle are key ingredients in limiting the risk of approving uneconomic projects and of experiencing cost/schedule over-runs